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Burma’s Democratic Transition: The Internationalization of Justice, the
Challenge of Legitimacy, and the Necessity of Facing Past Political Violence
by Daniel Rothenberg*

Attempts to face past political violence
are often presented as a binary opposition
of “prosecute and punish versus forgive
and forget.”

internationalization of justice. Such a position is likely to
increase tension between the negotiating parties, delay a possible transition, and ultimately produce results different
from those intended by any of the parties. Conversely, a
willingness on the part of the Burmese military to accept
responsibility for past violations of basic human rights may
well provide the parties with more long-term protection
than a negotiated general amnesty. In order to move beyond
this tension, strategies for enabling a political change in
Burma should be evaluated in relation to their ability to
confer legitimacy on the transitional process, particularly as
regards a reckoning with the nation’s legacy of violations of
human rights.
Burma’s Crisis and the Necessity of a Democratic Transition
Burma’s current crisis involves profound and systematic
dysfunction as a result of decades of governmental mismanagement. In this sense, Burma’s crisis is a political prob10
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urma is a nation in crisis. The country faces severe economic stagnation, endemic poverty, and serious health
and social welfare challenges, all within a context of
significant international isolation. Burma’s status as an international pariah represents a global response to a history of
gross human rights violations as well as the refusal of the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the ruling military
regime, to recognize the overwhelming victory of the National
League of Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 elections. It is difficult to imagine how Burma can respond to its current crisis without addressing its global political isolation, a process
that will almost certainly require a political transition from
authoritarian rule to a constitutionally based electoral democracy. In this sense, the question facing Burma is not so much
whether there needs to be a democratic transition, but
rather how this transition will be managed, and when it will
take place.
One of the most important and contentious issues of a possible Burmese political transition involves how the larger society should respond to the military regime’s legacy of human
rights violations. Attempts to face past political violence are
often presented as a binary opposition of “prosecute and punish versus forgive and forget.” This perspective creates an
impasse with democracy and human rights activists claiming
the first option, and the SPDC advocating the second.
Understanding Burma’s future as a choice between criminal prosecutions or a general amnesty fundamentally misreads contemporary ideas on transitional justice as well as the
current demands of a world increasingly committed to the

Burmese working in a rice field near Inle Lake.

lem expressing the negative impact of authoritarianism on
every sector of society.
The SPDC is highly repressive. Gross violations of human
rights are common, including disappearances, extrajudicial
killings, torture, and rape, particularly in rural areas dominated by ethnic minorities. The military government engages
in widespread forced labor as evidenced by recent International Labor Organization investigations. The regime detains
and imprisons citizens at will, targeting virtually anyone
whose activities are perceived to be even remotely expressive
of political dissent. The SPDC also engages in widespread surveillance, censors all published material, and generally prevents citizens from gaining legal access to outside information. There is no independent judiciary in Burma and no
meaningful rule of law.
Economically, Burma is in a very difficult situation. Despite
its exceptional natural wealth, the nation’s per capita income
is only U.S.$300 per year. The nation’s infrastructure is
crumbling, living standards are poor, and attempts to stimulate foreign investment have been largely unsuccessful.
Socially, Burma suffers from endemic poverty within a
repressive system that offers residents precious few opportunities. The government’s policies have severely impacted
the educational system, leaving the country with a serious lack
of trained professionals necessary for sustained development. In addition, Burma is deeply divided along ethnic
lines and faces several armed ethnic resistance movements.
Burma’s crisis is profoundly exacerbated by the nation’s
international isolation such that it is difficult to imagine
how the nation can address its political, economic, and
social crisis without reintegrating itself within the larger
world system. By ending its isolation, Burma will be able to
gain access to foreign investment and international aid,
including loans, financial assistance, training, infrastructure projects, and other mechanisms designed to encourage
national development. It is nonetheless highly unlikely that
continued on next page
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When the literature on democratic transitions first emerged,
discussions of these issues were often presented as a choice
Burma can move beyond its current pariah status without
between “prosecute and punish versus forgive and forget.” It
engaging in a democratic transition.
quickly became clear that this binary distinction was inadequate
Although it is probably too early to know whether the
for documenting the complex experiences of different counnation’s transitional process has begun, important negotiatries or accounting for the multiplicity of distinct strategies for
tions have taken place between the SPDC and Aung San Suu
dealing with the challenges of facing past political violence.
Kyi, the NLD General Secretary and recipient of the 1991
To a large degree, the emergence of the transitional justice
Nobel Peace Prize. The subject of these negotiations remains
field is the result of a growing recognition of the inherent comsecret, yet the establishment of communication, underplexity of responding to political violence while simultaneously
standing, and some level of trust between the military regime
developing subtle, engaged, and context-specific responses to
and the democracy movement is the first step toward a negothese issues. It is now common to consider political transitions
tiated political transition. For this reason, it is an especially
as involving an array of possible strategies and policy options,
important time for those interested in Burma’s future to learn
including: truth commissions, monetary reparations, apologies,
from the transitional experiences of other nations with a keen
mechanisms of restorative justice, economic investment, monsensitivity to the contemporary
uments and memorialization, psyglobal political climate.
cho-social healing, the opening of
security archives, and other means
Authoritarian states’ reliance on systemic
of facing past violence in order to
Transitional Justice and State
build the foundations of a new
Legitimacy
political violence often calls into question
democratic order.
From the 1970s through the
the legitimacy of such regimes, providing
Although not always under1990s, dozens of countries around
important intellectual and political support
stood in this manner, democratic
the world shifted from authoritartransitions and the related field
ian to democratic rule, defining
for political change.
of transitional justice are fundasuch political change as a key elementally concerned with the issue
ment of late 20th century politics.
of state legitimacy. For a transiBecause authoritarian regimes are
tion to be successful, both the process and the resulting
characterized by systematic violations of fundamental human
democratic state must be understood to be legitimate in
rights, democratic transitions often involve the special chalboth domestic and international spheres. As the ideas and
lenge of responding to past political violence. The theoretmechanism of transitional justice become more widespread,
ical and practical considerations of these issues define the
they become increasingly institutionalized as mechanisms of
emerging interdisciplinary field of transitional justice.
legitimizing a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule. In
The justice issues raised in transitional societies are of a
this way, transitional societies are obligated to use the lanspecial nature because they are directly linked to larger sociguage and policies of transitional justice as a means of ensuretal processes of political change that define the character
ing that their nations’ transitions are accepted, particularly
of the new regime. Authoritarian states’ reliance on syswithin the international community.
temic political violence often calls into question the legitimacy of such regimes, providing important intellectual and
The Internationalization of Justice — Two Perspectives
political support for political change. Similarly, new demoDeveloping alongside the institutionalization of transicratic regimes have an obligation to address the moral, polittional justice strategies for legitimizing democratic transiical, and legal demands of victims as a means of distintions is a growing interest in the internationalization of crimguishing themselves from the past government and
inal justice for perpetrators of human rights violations. This
grounding their vision of democracy in a fundamental
interest has grown considerably over the last decade. This
respect for basic rights and rule of law.
trend is evidenced by the movement to establish an InternaNevertheless, most transitions are negotiated processes
tional Criminal Court, the creation of ad hoc international
involving parties advocating democratic rule as well as repcriminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,
resentatives of the authoritarian regime, who are often the
and the increasing use of domestic courts to bring criminal
same individuals (or members of the same organizations)
and civil cases against individuals accused of gross violations
responsible for past political violence. As such, determining
of human rights. All of these activities are linked to one of the
the most appropriate response to past violence is a complex
most basic principles of international law: the idea that one
challenge, particularly when authoritarian leaders retain
cannot engage in an international criminal case without first
significant power during the transitional process. On the one
exhausting domestic remedies. Both the widespread use of
hand, the new regime is compelled to respect the claims of
transitional justice strategies and the recent increase in intervictims of political violence by adhering to basic rule of law
national prosecutions are expressions of a general global conprinciples and as an expression of a commitment to prosensus to deny states the possibility of failing to face their
tecting fundamental human rights. On the other hand, the
legacies of gross violations of human rights. As such, the internew regime must ensure that the transitional process is stanational cases arising out of democratic transitions typically
ble, peaceful, and long-lasting, which may involve an agreeexpress the measured determination of an essential failure
ment to limit legal responsibility for past political violence.
within the transitional process.
A successfully negotiated transition typically involves balTo help make sense of the interrelationship between
ancing the demand for justice with the practical need to plathese two global trends and their link to a future Burmese
cate powerful representatives of the departing authoritarian
regime.
Burmese Democratic Transition, continued from previous page
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The Amnesty Process of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission
The South African case presents a different situation in
which the international community has largely supported a
negotiated transition that provided perpetrators with a limited amnesty for their legal responsibility for gross violations of human rights. This approach is especially significant
considering South Africa’s status as an international pariah
during the apartheid era.
The transition from a racially based minority rule to a
democratically elected government was a complex process
involving lengthy negotiations, the drafting of a new constitution, the first free and fair general elections in the
nation’s history, massive investment to address basic social
needs, and significant legislative changes. The negotiations
also involved the decision to form the Truth and Reconcil12
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The “Pinochet Precedent”
From late 1998 through early 2000, General Pinochet was detained in London
pending possible extradition to Spain to
face charges of terrorism, genocide,
and other gross violations of human
rights. The case became one of the
most widely discussed legal issues of
the century’s end, representing the
first time that a nation’s domestic
court was used successfully to enforce
internationally recognized human
rights principles against a former
head of state for crimes committed in
a different country. Although Pinochet
was eventually released for medical reasons, the Spanish high court affirmed
the legality of the case and the British
high court ruled that the ex-dictator could
be extradited, defining what is sometimes
referred to as the “Pinochet precedent.” The
case is of great legal significance because it
affirmed the principle of universal jurisdiction
for prosecuting alleged perpetrators of human
rights violations, negated the legal protection
of general amnesties provided to former perpetrators
in the Spanish cases, and denied the protection of sovereign
and head of state immunity for former leaders in the British
cases.
The widespread international support for the case defines
an emerging international commitment to taking legal
action against the institutionalized impunity that has long protected former leaders of brutal regimes. To a large degree,
the broad international support for the case expresses a
general criticism of the Chilean transition as illegitimate
because it provided a broad amnesty to General Pinochet and
the military government he controlled. In this respect, the
“Pinochet precedent” is a warning for authoritarian leaders,
both in and out of power, who have engineered similar
mechanisms of domestic legal protection.

State

transition, it is useful to compare the arrest and detention
of General Augusto Pinochet, the former autocratic leader
of Chile’s military dictatorship, with the international community’s response to South Africa’s transitional experience.

iation Commission (TRC) to deal with key elements of transitional justice.
The mission of the TRC was to assist the nation in facing
its legacy of gross violations of human rights. To accomplish its mandate, the Commission was divided into three
committees: a human rights committee that gathered and
analyzed data and testimony on political violence and held
numerous public hearings; a reparations committee that
considered how to provide victims with financial assistance; and an amnesty committee that allowed perpetrators to receive full civil and criminal protection for particular crimes. Perpetrators could
receive amnesty only if their crimes were of a
political nature and they were willing to tell the
full truth about the events in question. For
some, the idea of providing amnesty to perpetrators who confessed was highly immoral,
while for others the strategy represented
an important means of revealing the shadowy violence that defined the apartheid
state as part of a larger process of national
reconciliation.
The international community generally
views the TRC positively and considers South
Africa to be a prime example of a legitimate
political transition. It is thus highly unlikely
that a foreign nation would be willing or capable of prosecuting those South African perpetrators granted amnesty through the TRC
process. First, a careful review of the legality
of the domestic process would probably show
that the nation adequately engaged in reasonable rule of law procedures regarding
the crimes for which particular perpetrators
received amnesty. Almost every aspect of
the policies enacted was carefully designed
with broad domestic and international consultations, and premised upon a basic commitment to rule of law with an understanding
of the special challenges of a democratic transition.
Second, criminally prosecuting an individual provided with amnesty through the TRC would represent a
basic challenge to the legality of South Africa’s transitional
policies. If a court of one nation questioned the validity of
a South African amnesty (as numerous European courts
were willing to do in the Pinochet case), the act would stand
as a political judgment that the TRC and the larger transitional process was fundamentally illegitimate. Because the
transitional process generally has been understood to have
been highly legitimate, South African perpetrators whose
amnesty petitions were approved by the TRC (though not
those denied amnesty or those who never sought amnesty)
are likely to benefit from a general protection against international prosecution.
For democratic transitions to be considered legitimate,
they must appear to be genuinely engaged in a serious reckoning with past human rights violations. This is particularly true
for nations such as Burma, which are isolated and display a relatively weak international status. To avoid the global consensus of illegitimacy regarding Chile’s general amnesty (that led
to subsequent international prosecutions) and to achieve the
continued on next page
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Burmese Democratic Transition, continued from previous page

legitimacy of South Africa’s partial amnesty (that will likely protect perpetrators from international prosecution), Burma’s
future democratic transition will require a formal reckoning
with responsibility for past human rights violations.
Conclusion
Burma has much to gain from formally engaging with the
ideas and policy options of transitional justice as a means of
ensuring the legitimacy of future political change. To grasp
the significance of these issues, it is important to consider that
transitional justice in both theory and practice is structured
by two basic principles: first, a recognition that each nation’s
transitional experience is unique and molded by distinct
social, cultural, and historical factors; and second, that there
are basic moral understandings, legal principles, and logistical issues common to all democratic transitions. By formally
acknowledging the second principle—evoking the language

of transitional justice, seeking to learn from the experiences
of other nations, and openly accepting basic international
human rights standards—Burma may well increase the international community’s willingness to respect the first principle— Burma’s need to find its own solutions to its problems.
By addressing its violent past, Burma can ensure that a
future transition is accepted at an international level while
retaining a relatively high degree of autonomy regarding specific policy decisions. In negotiating its future political transition, Burma need not engage in full-scale prosecutions
and may or may not choose to grant some form of amnesty
to past perpetrators. To achieve the international legitimacy
necessary for a successful transition, however, Burma must
formally reckon with its legacy of gross violations of human
rights and the related questions of responsibility. 
* Daniel Rothenberg is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the
University of Michigan; Fellow, Michigan Society of Fellows.

Northern Ireland, continued from page 9

to serve all of the community equally. The nationalist political parties retaliated to the weakening of Patten’s proposals by refusing to take their seats on the new Policing Board.
In their August 2001 package of proposals for the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, the British and
Irish governments undertook to publish a revised Implementation Plan for policing reform, which has persuaded one
of the nationalist parties, the Social Democratic and Labor
Party, to take up its seats on the Policing Board.
Among others, the U.S. Congress is concerned about the
failure to implement properly the Patten recommendations.
Other groups, such as British Irish RIGHTS WATCH, view the
greatest concern about policing in Northern Ireland as Patten’s refusal to address the question of how to root out those
who were serial human rights abusers under the old system.
Policing will change in Northern Ireland only if Catholic
nationalists are sufficiently confident to join and remain in the
new police service in numbers. This is unlikely to happen while
RUC officers who used violence, lies, and collusion as their daily
working methods are allowed to remain in place, without
ever being brought to justice and without having to take the
new oath. Unless Catholics can be persuaded to join and
remain in the new police service, the rule of law will continue
to be problematic in Northern Ireland.
Conclusion
Many argue that Northern Ireland needs a truth and reconciliation commission to deal with its past human rights
abuses, but the possibility of Northern Ireland’s establishing
a truth commission is highly unlikely. Truth commissions
have tended to be established in states in which regimes
have changed and the incoming governments have been prepared to allow investigators to subject the former government’s activities to scrutiny. Such conditions do not exist in
Northern Ireland, and resistance to any development on the
part of the “securocrats,” i.e., intelligence services and others who are responsible for state security, is likely to ensure
that a truth commission never develops. Without a truth

commission, there will be continued domestic and international pressure for costly public inquiries that may go on for
years and possibly hinder the peace process itself.
In hindsight, the human rights provisions of the Good Friday Agreement have been more well-intentioned than wellimplemented. The Agreement offers a unique opportunity
to consider the human rights deficit in Northern Ireland
holistically. British Irish RIGHTS WATCH and other NGOs
advocated for the wholesale reform of the system of criminal justice, looking at the issues of policing, emergency laws
and the system itself as arms of a single entity. Instead, the
government has allowed the criminal justice system to be
reviewed piecemeal, resulting in an incoherent strategy that
will not ensure the integrated and radical reforms that are
essential to the development of stability and peace in Northern Ireland. The conflict is by no means over. According to
British Irish RIGHTS WATCH’s calculations, over 170 people
have died since the 1994 cease-fires. The fear for most is that
missing the opportunity for more coherent human rights
reforms in Northern Ireland, together with the absence of
any effective mechanism for dealing with past abuses, may
one day be seen as having been a fatal error. 
* Jane Winter is the Director of British Irish RIGHTS WATCH and a
former Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at
the University of London. Natasha Parassram Concepcion is a J.D.
candidate at the Washington College of Law and co-editor-in-chief of
the Human Rights Brief.
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